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has never been overruled in Wisconsin, and a later case decided in
1908, substantially affirmed it in that point of law."6
The minority ruling as presented by the Wisconsin courts is upheld
in Pennsylvania,'17 Ohio, 8 Montana,' 9 Iowa,20 and Massachusetts. 21 The
Montana Court states its view of the question by saying that a prior
marriage, being shown undissolved, casts upon the relationship of the
parties to the second marriage the shadow of illegitimacy; they further
rule that upon this showing the "law's favorite presumption of inno-
cence" disappears, and the presumption of wrongdoing takes its place.
The burden of proof requires those asserting legitimacy to show the
validity of the subsequent marriage.22
The intention of the Wisconsin courts and of those other jurisdic-
tions following the minority view has been to preserve the integrity of
the marital status, a status which can only be properly dissolved by
death or by the legal fiction of divorce. The courts sustaining the ma-
jority view feel that their position, on the other hand, causes a lesser
hardship upon modem society, the innocent parties to the second mar-
riage, and the children of the second marriage. Nevertheless, although
the ruling case in Wisconsin was recently cited, erroneously it would
seem, as authority in a case following the majority view,23 the minority
opinion has been so long sustained in this state that it seems appar-
ent that Wisconsin will continue to uphold the rule first laid down in
this state in 1885.
MARGADETTE MOFFTT
Federal Taxation - Collateral Estoppel Where Decisional Law is
Changed or Clarified Between Trials Involving Different Tax Years -
The taxpayer was principal stockholder of a corporation, which he
licensed, under various royalty contracts, to manufacture and sell var-
ious devices, on which he had applied for patents. The taxpayer as-
signed his rights, title and interests in the contracts to his wife, at
various times, without consideration, and the royalty payments were
made to the wife. In 1935, the Board of Tax Appeals held the tax-
payer was not liable for income tax on payments made the wife during
16 Hilliard v. Wisconsin Life Insurance Co., 137 Wis. 208, 117 N.W. 999 (1908).
17Madison v. Lewis, 151 Pa. Super. 138, 30 A.(2d) 357 (1943). In this typical
fact situation the husband entered into a subsequent marriage while his
prior undivorced spouse was still living. Held: presumption of the con-
tinuing validity will be sustained.8 Industrial Commission of Ohio v. Dell, 104 Ohio St. 389, 135 N.E. 669 (1922).
'2 Welch v. All Persons, etc., 85 Mont. 114, 278 Pac. 110 (1929).
20 Barnes v. Barnes, 90 Iowa 282, 75 N.W. 851 (1894).2 1 Turner v. Williams, 202 Mass. 500, 89 N.E. 110 (1909).
2 2 Supra, note 19.
2 3 Supra, note 13.
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the years 1929-1931 pursuant to the 1928 licefise contract.' In 1946,
the taxpayer's liability for royalty payments during the years 1937 to
1941, to his wife, under the 1928, and later license contracts, was before
the Tax Court,2 and that Court held the taxpayer liable, except for 1937
payments made under the 1928 contract. The Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals reversed that part of the Tax Court's decision favorable to
the government, holding that the payments were not income to the
taxpayer, and affirmed that part of the Tax Court's holding, that res
judicata applied to the 1937 royalties paid under the 1928 agreement.3
The Supreme Court granted certiori. The taxpayer claimed the doc-
trine of res judicata applied to relieve him from liability. Held: the
contracts not before the Board in 1935, are different contracts from the
1928 contract, however similar or identical they are to it, therefore the
nature of these contracts was never litigated, and neither the doctrine
of res judicata, nor that of collateral estoppel apply to them, though
the court may apply the rule of stare decisis. As to the 1928 contract,
while the law of transferor's income tax liability was not changed
since 1935, it has so developed through the Clifford-Horst line of cases,4
that the legal climate is sufficiently changed that the doctrine of col-
lateral estoppel can no longer apply to the assignment of the 1928 con-
tract, and a reconsideration of the 1935 decision is justified in the light
of the doctrine of the Clifford-Horst cases. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 68 S.Ct. 715, 92 L.Ed. 673 (1948).
The doctrine of collateral estoppel is especially important in the
field of taxation, because of the constant recurrence of similar issues
in successive tax years. The doctrine differs from the doctrine of res
judicata in nature, and in force. The doctrine of res judicata applies
only to attempted relitigation of the same cause of action, and the doc-
trine bars the relitigation by merging the cause of action in the judg-
ment.5 The doctrine of collateral estoppel, on the other hand, applies
to suits on different claims, but where some or all of the issues are
the same or similar. The doctrine holds that where the issue is actu-
ally litigated in a prior trial, it may not be relitigated in a subsequent
trial of a different claim.4 There has been some confusion in the cases
' 32 B.T.A. 1337 (1935) Memo Op.
2 6 T.C. 431 (1946).
3161 F.(2d) 171 (C.C.A. 8th, 1947).
4 Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331, 60 S. Ct. 554, 84 L.Ed. 788 (1940);
Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112, 61 S. Ct. 144, 85 L.Ed. 75, 131 A.L.R. 655
(1940) ; Helvering v. Eubank, 311 U.S. 122, 61 S. Ct. 149, 85 L.Ed. 81 (1940) ;
Harrison v. Schaffner, 312 U.S. 579, 61 S. Ct. 759, 85 L.Ed. 1055 (1941);
Commissioner v. Tower, 327, U.S. 280, 66 S. Ct. 532, 90 L.Ed. 670 (1946);
and Lusthaus v. Commissioner, 327 U.S. 293, 66 S. Ct. 539, 90 L.Ed. 679(1946), all of which cases related to income transferor's liability for income
tax thereon.
5 Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351, 24 L.Ed. 195 (1877) ; Tait v. Western
Maryland Railway Co., 289 U.S. 620, 53 S. Ct. 706, 77 L.Ed. 1405 (1933).6 Ibid., 94 U.S. 351.
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between these two doctrines,7 but this is probably because the limits on
the doctrine of collateral estoppel have not been too well defined.8 This
case should go far to settle some of this confusion.
In Cromwell v. County of Sac,9 the Supreme Court, in 1877, laid
down the rule that where there is a second suit on a different claim or
demand between the same parties, the estoppel doctrine applies only
to the matters in issue, or the points controverted, which were deter-
minative of the judgment. In 1897, the Court held that each year's
tax liability constitutes a separate cause of action, and res judicata does
not apply to a second suit.:" And in 1927, the Court would seem to
have clinched the question by their decision that a prior judgment was
not conclusive as to matters of law in later suits between the same
parties."- However, in 1933, in Tait, Collector of Internal Revenue v.
Western Maryland Railway Co., 2 the Court said that where the same
question, but for a different tax year, has been decided, that is res
judicata as to the liability for a different tax year. This case seems to
have caused some of the difficulty in the lower courts.'3 The law in
that case had remained the same in the period between the two suits,
and that was noted by the Court, but the Court's use of the words "res
judicata" may have caused some of the confusion. The rule applied in
the Western Maryland case is still good, when the law remains the same
between the two cases. The Blair case'4 followed this in 1936, and said
that where a decision of a state court intervenes between the prior and
later suits, the rule of collateral estoppel does not apply. This rule still
did not clear up the confusion, though, regarding changes in federal
decisional law, as state law was held to be a matter of fact, and not
of law, as far as the federal courts were concerned.15 Now, however,
the Sunnen case makes it clear that changes in federal decisional law
7 See Tillman v. National City Bank of New York, 118 F.(2d) 631 (C.C.A. 2d,
1941), holding that findings based on stipulation are as binding as findings
actually litigated in the prior suit, and citing the Western Maryland case
(fn. 5), and see also Commissioner v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 141
F.(2d) 774 (C.C.A. 2d, 1944), holding a prior decision res judicate, though
federal decisional law had changed between suits; and compare these with
Henricksen v. Seward, 135 F.(2d) 986, 150 A.L.R. 1 (C.C.A. 9th, 1943);
Corrigan v. Commissioner, 155 F.(2d) 164 (C.C.A. 6th, 1946), and Traveler's
Insurance Co. v. Commissioner, 161 F.(2d) 93 (C.C.A. 2d, 1947), holding
changes in the law prevented the application of the collateral estoppel or resjudicate doctrines.
s See Pelham Hall Co. v. Bassett, 147 F.(2d) 63 (C.C.A. 1st, 1945).9 Supra, fn. 5.
1o New Orleans v. Citizen's Bank, 167 U.S. 371, 17 S. Ct. 905, 42 L.Ed. 202
(1897).
". U.S. v. Stone & Downer Co., 274 U.S. 225, 47 S. Ct. 616, 71 L.Ed. 1013 (1927).
12289 U.S. 620, 53 S. Ct. 706, 77 L.Ed. 1405 (1933).
's See fn. 7, fn. 8, and Commissioner v. Arundel-Brooks Concrete Corp., 152
F.(2d) 225, 162 A.L.R. 1200 (C.C.A. 4th, 1945).
14 Blair v. Commissioner, 300 U.S. 5, 57 S. Ct. 330, 81 L.Ed. 465 (1937).




are sufficient to rule out collateral estoppel, and the case goes even
further than past cases, and says that an intervening clarification of
the law may be sufficient ground on which to base a reconsideration
of matters found in a prior case.
Another matter that has caused some trouble has been the finding
based on mixed fact and law. It has been held that while res judicata
(presumably meaning collateral estoppel) does not apply to a strict
question of law, where a fact, question or right is found by an erron-
eous application of the law, that finding is binding is a subsequent suit
between the same parties.16 However, this would seem to be cleared
up by the Sunnen case, as all income transferor tax liability cases would
seem to involve mixed findings of fact and law. The injustice that
would be done by holding the parties to a finding based upon an erron-
eous application of the law, or upon law which is later changed or clari-
fied by decision, is not hard to imagine, especially in income tax cases.
While authority is abundant that changes in the law, statutory and
decisional, would throw out the plea of res judicata or collateral estop-
pel in a later suit.- the liberal rule of the Sunnen case, that mere clari-
fication of the law is sufficient to create a change in the "legal atmos-
phere", does not seem to have the same support in the cases, but it is
a rule that should prevent much injustice. The American Law Institute
would apparently go as far, however' s The res judicata and collateral
estoppel doctrines are based on a public policy, only, which attempts to
settle matters once litigated. A public policy as this will not be allowed
to prevent justice, by causing the perpetuation of an error in later suits
involving different claims.'9
JAMES KIRSCHLING
Sales - Consummation of Sales in Self-Service Stores - Plaintiffs
entered the self-service store of the Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea
Company. The husband selected two bottles of ginger ale and proceed-
ed to place them in his merchandise cart when one bottle exploded. A
piece of glass therefrom struck his wife in the leg causing her serious
injury. Defendants were engaged in the business of manufacturing and
bottling the ginger ale. This product was sold and delivered to the
Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Company for resale in its stores. Plaintiffs
based their action on assumpsit for breach of implied warranty of fit-
16 U.S. v. Moser, 266 U.S. 236, 45 S. Ct. 66, 69 L.Ed. 263 (1924). See also, Gris-
wold, "Res Judicate in Federal Tax Cases," 56 Yale L.J. 1320, at pp. 1333,
1334, 1355, 1356, but see p. 1335 for cases contra (1937).
'1 State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Co. v. Duel, 324 U.S. 154, 65 S. Ct. 573,
89 L.Ed. 812 (1945), and see fns. 5, 10, 11 and 14, supra.
3s American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law of judgments, sec. 70 (1942).
19 See fn. 18, supra, and also Henricksen v. Seward, 135 F. (2d) 986, 150 A.L.R.
1 (C.C.A. 9th, 1943).
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